transmission, many people wonder how anyone could possibly intend to have a child under such circumstances. They are appalled and mysti fied by reports of HIV-infected women who become pregnant again af ter watching their first child die of AIDS. From their perspective, the decision to reproduce under the specter of AIDS is a paradigmatic ex ample of parental irresponsibility.
On the other hand, many AIDS counselors and activists, advocates o f reproductive rights, and infected women insist that the choice to beat children or not is a quintessentially private choice for the woman. They note that infected women have a fundamental, constitutionally protected right to make such decisions, and that, whereas many others might differ with their conclusions, these women can and do make responsible decisions based upon their own cultural, social, and eco nomic conditions. Recalling the past abuses of genetic counseling in minority communities, these voices condemn directive counseling as a presumptuous, selective, and possibly racist assault on the reproductive rights of a highly vulnerable population.
This article draws on both sides of the debate and attempts a fusion o f these opposed perspectives. I shall argue that although the risk of perinatal HIV transmission is not presently a sufficient warrant for morally criticizing any particular woman's choice, and although many women's decisions to have children may be eminently justifiable, a contextualized assessment of several morally relevant variables might nonetheless justify judgments of reproductive irresponsibility in some cases. Should the future development of a reliable prenatal diagnostic test make some infected women's choices clearly unacceptable accord ing to the societal consensus on acceptable risk, I argue that society w ould be justified, absent corresponding breakthroughs in AIDS treat ment, in articulating and encouraging compliance with a normative standard of responsible reproduction.
The final section of the article probes the implications of these ethi cal conclusions for possible societal interventions on the reproductive choices of HIV-infected women. Rejecting any and all forms of coercive actions, threats, or pressures, I call for a "moral education" model of nondirective counseling for most HIV-infected women. Under some rigidly defined circumstances, however, I argue that even a version of directive counseling might be morally permissible now for some clearly irresponsible decisions and, in the future, for all infected women desig nated by a reliable prenatal diagnostic test.
The Medical and Social C o n t e x t

The Paces o f Pediatric A ID S
The epidemiological dimensions of pediatric AIDS are alarming. As of April 1990, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has reported ap proximately 1,800 cases of perinatally transmitted pediatric AIDS, and it is reasonable to assume that three to four times that number are HIV infected (Centers for Disease Control 1990). In those urban neighbor hoods most seriously affected by intravenous drug use, the percentage of infected women delivering children reaches as high as 4 or 5 percent (Novick et al. 1989) . Nationally, 1.5 women out of every 1,000 deliver ing a child are infected, which yields a total of approximately 5,900 births to infected mothers per year (Gwinn 1990) . Although the exact dimensions of the pediatric epidemic are hard to gauge, we can expect the number of newly infected children to rise steadily over the next several years as the focus of the larger epidemic shifts to drug addicts and their sexual partners in the inner cities.
Much medical uncertainty derives from our inability to detect HIV infection in utero or before the child's first year of life. Virtually all children of HIV-positive women will be born with antibodies to the AIDS vims, but most of these will not actually be infected. Their socalled "passive" antibodies come from the mothers' blood and usually disappear after one year (Falloon, et al. 1989) . Current studies indicate that the risk of acmal perinatal HIV infection through any given preg nancy lies somewhere between 20 percent and 30 percent (Andiman et al. I99O; Falloon et al. 1989; Ryder and Hassig 1988) .
Our current inability to predict which pregnancies will result in the vertical transmission of the AIDS vims may, however, be remedied in the near future. A number of researchers have already reported promis ing leads that might, within two years, yield a prenatal test with a high degree of reliability. Preliminary studies indicate that children born to mothers with antibodies to the glycoprotein gpl20 may have a higher likelihood (e.g., 85 to 90 percent) of being negative, whereas the ab sence of such antibodies might predict the presence of infection (Rossi et al. 1989; Devash et al. 1990; Goedert et al. 1990 ). Although such a maternal blood test would not allow the same degree of confidence available in prenatal tests for disorders like Down's syndrome or TaySachs disease, it would vastly improve our prognostic capacities and sig nificantly alter the moral equation.
What is the long-term clinical outlook for children infected with HIV? This question is complicated by a wide spectrum of clinical mani festations. The most se .merely afflicted children present with adult-style opportunistic infections, such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), during the first year of life. Constituting nearly one-fourth of all in fected children in some clinics, these children tend to do extremely poorly, usually dying painful deaths within a month or two after diag nosis. Other infected children have far milder manifestations, such as bacterial infections, are diagnosed at a later date, and live much longer (Scott 1989) .
The aggregate median survival time for infected children in one re cent study was 38 months from the time of diagnosis (Scott 1989) . The death toll of HIV infection is highest in the first year, with rates in the range of 17 to 25 percent. After that, we can expect the progressively deteriorating immunological status of most HIV-infectcd children to lead eventually, although perhaps over a period of several years, to se vere opportunistic infections and death. Thus, assuming no dramatic breakthroughs in antiviral therapy over the next few years, we can pre dict that approximately 25 to 30 percent of all infected children will die before two years; 50 percent may die before their seventh birthday; and most of the remainder will face the constant threat of premature death from inevitable opportunistic infections.
Such estimates of prognosis and mortality are a moving target, how ever, due to the recent availability of dmgs like zidovudine (A2T), prophylactic agents against opportunistic infections, and the promise of even more effective drugs in the near future. Despite some serious side effects, many clinicians report benefits from AZT therapy in children, both in terms of length and quality of life (Pizzo 1989; Warren Andiman 1990, personal communication) . However, it is still too early to tell whether such treatments will only delay the inevitable for a year or more, as appears to be the case with most adults. Still, the advent of effective early intervention against HIV infection in children holds out the possibility of transforming HIV infection from a nearly uniformly fatal illness into a chronic, yet extremely burdensome, disease.
The Social Context
In contrast to most genetic diseases, the diagnosis of AIDS in a child usually signals an entire family at risk-a "dying family" (Septimus 1989) . By the time the diagnosis is made, the father is often already sick or dead and the mother must cope not only with an afflicted child, but also with the dread of her own approaching symptoms and death. Many parents are too ill to take responsibility for the care of their own children, both infected and normal, who are often abandoned in hos pitals or handed over to foster care (Gross 1987) .
With the exception of spouses o f HIV-infected hemophiliacs-who, as of April 1990, have given birth to 113 infected babies (Centers for Disease Control 1990)-the mothers of these children tend to be poor and members of minority groups. They become infected either through intravenous dmg use or heterosexual contact with infected drug users or bisexual men.
In spite of the seriousness of the risk of perinatal transmission to their offspring, HIV infection and its accompanying moral dilemmas are often fat down on the list of immediate concerns occupying these women. Typically, women at risk of HIV infection are also subjected to all the shocks and ills of life in urban ghettos: poverty, chronic unem ployment, poor or nonexistent education, substandard housing, crime, drug abuse, spousal abuse, and the lack of medical and social supports. What to do about HIV infection is thus often perceived as just one more problem within an unrelentingly grim horizon. (See "Uncertain Risks and Bitter Realities" by Carol .Levine and Nancy N. Dubler in this issue.)
Finally, infected women belong to subcultures that view childbear ing as an often unique source of female self-esteem and social respect (Gross 1987; Holman et al. 1989) . Although women from these sub cultures cannot be said to value children more than other women, al ternative sources of respect and gratification (e.g., education, enjoyable work, public service, or raising adopted children) are effectively closed off to them. Thus, whereas middle-class women might consider compa rable risks of a bad outcome to be prohibitive, most HIV-infected women do not opt for abortion (Selwyn et al. 1989 )-
Neglected Issues
Access to Health Care a n d Reproductive Services
Although the problems addressed in this article are pressing and im portant, they are not the only, or even the major ethical problems con cerning women at risk for the perinatal transmission of AIDS. Although the issues of reproductive choice and appropriate counseling are per haps most amenable to an individualistic focus and spirited ethical de bate, problems of social justice and access to services are of paramount ethical importance as we enter the second decade of the AIDS epi demic. In contrast to their middle-class critics, who would have them exercise greater reproductive responsibility, the women we are talking about suffer daily from intense social discrimination and lack of access to the most basic levels of prenatal and primary medical care, effective drug rehabilitation, sex education, and abonion services.
In the context of such pervasive injustice and deprivation, an exclu sive concern to limit the reproductive activity of HIV-infected women is both short sighted and hypocritical. Professions of concern for the off spring of HIV-infected women would ring tmer if those advocating more reproductive responsibility also called for some long-overdue so cial responsibility toward the needs of poor women of color (see Levine and Dubler in this issue). Honoring the terms of the social conuact with these women through economic, social, medical, and educational opportunities would do much to augment their decision-making capacities.
Indeed, lack of access to the health-care system is direcdy related to the outcome of women's reproductive decisions. In stark contrast to middle-class women, HIV-infected pregnant women rarely make early contact with the health-care system. One smdy of 49 medical centers by researchers at the National Institutes of Health found, for example, that only 17 percent of HIV-positive women began prenatal care during the first trimester. O f the remainder, 43 percent made their first con tact during the second trimester. 22 percent during the third trimester, and 17 percent had no prenatal care at all (Stratton, Mofenson, and Willoughby 1990) . Because abortion becomes much more problematic (medically, psychologically, and ethically) after the first trimester, it should come as no surprise that the reproductive decisions of these women are not significantly altered by their contacts with the health care system. Whether or not one agrees with the controversial claim that society has no m oral righ t to encourage reproductive restraint among HIV-infected women in the absence of improved access to med ical and social services (see Levine and Dubler, this issue) , the provision o f these services early in pregnancy is obviously a necessary precondition o f counseling and increased restraint.
The sad truth, however, is that even a concerted public effort to fos ter social justice will not eliminate the ethical questions o f whether HIV-infected women should have children and how to counsel them. We are not faced with an either/or choice between social and individ ual responsibility. Clearly, our society must be condemned for failing to provide HIV-infected women with decent and humane medical ser vices and more equitable social opportunities. Equally clearly, the re productive decisions of infected women have serious and problematic ethical implications for their offspring, which require careful examina tion. The well-being of children should not be held hostage, even to legitimate and pressing demands for social reform.
The Responsibility o f Men
An attentive witness to the public debate over AIDS and reproductive responsibility could easily conclude that men have nothing to do with either the problem or its solution. There are several plausible explana tions for this exclusive focus on women's choices and the counseling of women. First, women often lack committed partners willing to share the burdens of decision making, not to mention the burdens of child rearing. They are thus often the only responsible moral agents left on the scene to engage. Second, because women have a direct physiologi cal connection to children th^t men lack, educational and counseling efforts directed to them will naturally be more focused and efficient. Likewise, women in need of prenatal health care are much more likely than their young male counterparts to enter the health-care system and to be attentive to messages about the possible fate of their offspring. Finally, it should not be at all surprising that men's responsibility goes unnoticed when we consider how the case for women's reproductive freedom has been pressed so persistently and exclusively in the lan guage of feminist liberal individualism. We are so used to being told, for example, that abortion is a "private choice" for the "woman alone" to make that it requires some effort to recall that men might yet have some legitimate role in collaborative reproductive decision making and considerable responsibility for reproductive outcomes.
Even though this article will focus on women's pivotal role in deci sion making and counseling, we must bear in mind throughout that a heavy burden of responsibility falls on men as well. As the primary vec tors of AIDS, men at risk for HIV infection have a rigorous moral duty both to inform their female sex partners of their status and to refrain from engaging in unprotected sexual activity that endangers both the women and their future children. Thus, public educational messages concerning "safer" sex and reproductive responsibility must also be ad dressed to men.
The Decision to Reproduce: Preliminary Ethical Considerations
A M oral Issue
Because our public discourse about reproduction focuses on the moral or legal right to make decisions, we often overlook the fact that the concrete decision about whether or not to bear a child is fraught with m oral significance. Given that women have the right to choose, how should they choose? Whatever one's views on the moral permissibility of abortion, a new born child is, or will soon become, a being with a separate dignity and genuine interests. Children are not the possessions of their parents or mere means to the satisfaction of parental desires (S. Callahan 1979) . Once a woman decides to carry a child to term, her ferns-whatever its abstract metaphysical status-becomes a future child, who, when born, will have a serious stake in life and health. If the intentional and avoid able actions or health status of pregnant women cause predictable dam age that will manifest itself in illness and disability for the children who will be born, we can legitimately criticize them for failing to re spect their children's separate dignity and entitlement to protection.
The claim that reproductive decisions should be the object of moral scrutiny is deeply troubling to many people, and for good reason. In a legal climate waxing increasingly hostile toward women's self-determin ation, one need not be paranoid to interpret calls for greater reproduc tive responsibility as part of a repressive, patriarchal strategy to curb reproductive rights. Although there are cenainly grounds for caution in this sensitive area, a salutary defensiveness about women's rights should not preclude discussion o f the moral use of those rights in the age of AIDS.
Here too, we are not faced with an either/or choice between individ ual rights on the one hand and making conscientious choices on the other. If, as Ronald Bayer (1989) has cogently argued, the challenge posed by the AIDS crisis is the voluntary alteration of deep-seated be haviors, and if this in turn depends upon the creation of a public cul ture of restraint and responsibility -a culture that largely eschews coercive legal measures as both unethical and counterproductive -then we must strive to foster a public dialogue about the ethical implications of AIDS for parental responsibility. Given the alarming toll of pediatric AIDS, we must at least attempt to chart the contours of a moral cul ture in which the content of women's reproductive decisions might be critically discussed, while their legal right to make such decisions re mains inviolate (D. Callahan 1981) .
Different Choices
The ethics of deciding whether or not to reproduce crucially depends upon the means chosen to that end. The alternatives are preventing the coming-into-being of a child through contraception and sterilization or the prenatal destruction of a potential human life by means of abor tion. Clearly, women can and do differ on the moral permissibility of all three methods of avoiding reproduction.
For the vast majority of women, contraception is not viewed as a morally problematic means of limiting fertility. By preventing the union of sperm and egg, most contraceptive methods do not entail the destmetion of a being already in possession of its full, human genetic code. Because unconjoined gametes are not the sort of beings that have interests or a stake in things, preventing them from joining together to form a new life does them no harm and violates no one's interests (Feinberg 1984; Steinbock in press) .
By contrast, sterilization and abortion pose serious psychological, moral, and political problems. Although some women might prefer sterilization as the most effective barrier to the transmission of HIV to the fetus, many others would reject it as a psychologically devastating and irrevocable solution that might subsequently be regretted in light of future medical advances. In addition, given this country's history of coercive sterilization of poor women of color, any widespread discussion of sterilization, even if completely voluntary, is bound to heat up the already charged political atmosphere with accusations of eugenics and genocide.
In contrast to artificial contraception, which hardly anyone thinks immoral, abortion poses complex psychological and moral problems. No matter how necessary or justified, the termination of a pregnancy will usually be an occasion of sadness and a sense of loss for the woman. Furthermore, from a moral perspective, abortion is obviously a hotly contested issue. Some think abortion morally justified in most circumstances, especially to prevent the transmission of HIV; others be lieve that early abortions are permissible, but that late-term abortions are not; still others consider all abortion the moral equivalent of mur der. Although the latter group might be urged to use contraceptives, they can hardly be expected to abandon strongly held religious beliefs about abortion. Accordingly, it should be more difficult to establish a moral duty to abort at-risk fetuses than to justify a duty to prevent con ception in the first place.
Moral Elements of Reproductive Responsibility
Assessing the ethical dimensions of reproductive choices is a complex, difficult, and controversial task. We must first identify the most impor tant elements of any ethical assessment and then attempt to weigh and balance them against one another. These elements include: (1) the ability and willingness of parents to assume their proper responsibihty for the child; (2) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (3) the proba bility of the harm actually occurring; and (4) the burden that parents must assume in order to avert the threatened harm. Although the list of elements is familiar, the task of weighing and comparing is complicated by the absence of clearly defined standards within each rubric (e.g.. What risks are acceptable? What parental bur dens are unbearable?) and by the absence of a recognized mle for rank ing the relative importance of each element (e.g.. What level of parental burden might compensate for a certain level of risk to the child?). At crucial points in the argument we will have to rely on inter pretations of vaguely defined societal standards embedded in our re sponses to analogous situations. This method may not be rigorous or "objective," but it would appear to give us the only kind of evidence and assurances allowed by the subject matter.
I canvass here two distinct arguments against HIV-infected women having children, both of which primarily concern the harm/probability ratio. The first is based narrowly upon the concept of "wrongful life" ; the second is premised on the more expansive notion of high risk of se rious harm. I begin, however, with some remarks on parental responsi bility because this element combines with any and all arguments based upon the magnitude and probability of harm.
Parental Inability to Assume Responsibility
As Sidney Callahan (1979) justly observes, a "principle of proportional ity" is applicable in reproductive ethics: the less consequential the risk, and the more one is able and willing to personally assume responsibil ity for bad outcomes, the more morally justified it is to assume the risk. In all too many cases, however, by the time children receive a di agnosis of HIV infection their parents ate themselves already dead, manifesting severe symptoms, or incapacitated by drug use (Septimus 1989) . As a result, they are often incapable of caring for the very chil dren whom they put at risk. Although it may be morally appropriate for parents to chance having a grievously afflicted child so long as they are willing and able to take responsibility for the child-provided that the child is not placed at excessive risk of serious harm-it is much more problematic to have a severely burdened child only to leave her bereft of parental nurturing through illness, death, or drug-induced neglect. The often intense desire for children must be tempered by an acknowledgment of one's responsibilities as a parent.
Parents have duties to their children to provide all sorts of things, including shelter, nutrition, education, and emotional nurturing. It is a good reason not to have children if a person can predict well in ad vance that he or she will be incapable of discharging these parental duties in the near future, and this is especially true in cases where the woman's male partner or extended family is likewise unavailable for patenting.
If parents are unable to discharge their responsibilities, foster care and adoption are reasonable and necessary remedies. The question, however, should be whether parents ought to put themselves and their children into such a position in the first place, knowing that the risk of eventual disconnection and forfeiture of duty is high. I believe that the presence of such a risk constitutes a good reason not to have children in the first place, whether or not the children turn out to be infected. However, this is not to say that it should in every case be a compel lin g reason for reproductive restraint; other factors might singly or in combination outweigh it in any given instance. Nevertheless, it is an important factor to be weighed in every case.
The H arm !Probability Ratio
In general, the greater the magnitude and probability of predicted harm, the less justifiable it is to have children. In spite of its apparent simplicity, this articulation of the "harm principle" invites controversy. A harm that some might view as excessive, others might consider an ac ceptable price to pay for a desired end. A level of risk that some find prohibitive might be quite tolerable to others accustomed to a different social milieu (Rescher 1983) . Notwithstanding this sort of controversy at the margins, paradigmatic examples of responsible and irresponsible reproductive behavior do exist and might provide a reasonably secure foundation for judgments about the choices of many HTV-infected women.
We shall shortly examine two distinct arguments for reproductive re straint based upon the harm principle. First, however, I want to make an important distinction between taking risks for oneself and for oth ers. When an act is "self-regarding," in the sense that its primary con sequences fall on the individual agent herself, we are righdy quite willing as a society to grant the individual very wide latimde in identi fying and evaluating risky behaviors. As Mill put it, when purely per sonal conduct is at stake, a meddling society will usually intervene wrongly and in the wrong place (Mill 1859)-When an act is "other regarding," however-that is, when it has po tentially harmful consequences for other persons-our attitude should be much more conservative. Behavior of this sort requires a far stronger moral justification than potentially self-destructive actions (Rescher 1983 ). It will not do, then, merely to ask what level of risk HIVinfected women are willing to run on their own behalf. Instead, we must attempt to determine the level o f risk to which they may justifi ably expose other persons.
The Claim o f " W rongful Life. " By far the most powerful argument against HIV-infected women having children would be that such a choice places future offspring at unacceptable risk of catastrophic harm. By this, I mean harms so great that no one would want to live such a life. In contrast to the usual sort of case where already existing persons are said to suffer harm, in these worst cases to be born in such a terri ble condition is itself said to constitute a harm to the child and a vio lation of his or her right to be born with at least a chance for a minimally decent life -hence the legal term, "wrongful life" (Feinberg 1984) .
According to this account, a child suffers the harm of wrongful life if it would be rational for a proxy chooser-that is, a representative of his or her "best interests" -to prefer nonexistence to the child's ever having been born. In other words, a "reasonable person" concerned about the child's welfare would conclude that, if all of his or her im portant interests, no matter what they are or might come to be, are doomed from the very start, it would be irrational to prefer the birth of such a child to nonexistence (Feinberg 1988) .
Equipped with an appropriately conservative attitude toward risk, a proponent of the wrongful-life argument would then hold that a 20 to 30 percent chance of exposing another person to HIV infection is quite simply too high. He might ask us to imagine society's response if thou sands of children with Tay-Sachs disease were born each year to known carriers who neglected to seek amniocentesis and abort afflicted fetuses. Such a widespread practice of exposing one of every four children to a wrongful life would clearly violate our societal norms of responsible re productive risk.
Although I think that the wrongful-life argument is valid in theory, its deployment in the present context is highly problematic. In order for the argument to succeed here, it must be shown that all (or at least the vast majority) of infected children will have lives so brief and so filled with suffering that they qualify as "wrongful." But given the bimodal manifestation of HIV infection in children, this will be ex tremely hard to show. Only a relatively small percentage (say, 10 to 20 percent) of those born HIV infected actually fit the worst-case scenario of early infection, chronic hospitalization, and death before the age of two. The rest will develop different and often less lethal manifestations of AIDS later on and will live longer, perhaps to the age of ten or be yond. The longer these children live with a tolerable quality of life, the more their lives will be worth living. A child who lives at home, goes to school, and attends summer camp does not fall into the same cate gory as a Tay-Sachs baby.
The consequence of this for the wrongful-life argument is that we cannot say that HIV-infected women expose their children to a 20 to 30 percent chance of a full-fledged medical disaster on the order of Tay-Sachs. Because at most only 20 percent of infected children fit this description, the odds of any given HIV-infected woman engendering a wrongful life would have to be reduced toward 5 percent. Those are significantly different odds, and it is not at all clear that taking such a risk would violate societal norms of responsible reproductive choice. H igh Risk o f Serious Harm. A second argument based on the harm principle concedes the low risk of wrongful life, but insists that the overall harm/probability ratio remains decidedly grim for HIV-infected children. They may be better off on average than children with TaySachs, but more than half will die before the age of six, and the re mainder must live under a cloud of impending death with progressively deteriorating immune systems. Even though many of these children will have lives that are "minimally decent" or "worth living," the deci sion to have them might still be faulted under certain circumstances. Instead of allowing only one clear, bright conceptual line, wrongful life, to demarcate the ambit of responsible decision making, the parti sans of this second argument would have us view parental responsibility as a complex function of the severity of the child's illness, the probabil ity of a bad outcome, and the availability of other options (Purdy 1989) .
Consider an example from Derek Parfit (1976) . Suppose a woman is told by her physician that if she gets pregnant while on a certain medi cation she will give birth to a child with a mild deformity, such as a withered arm; but if she waits a month, she can conceive a petfecdy normal child. If the woman refuses to wait and proceeds to have the child with the withered arm, she could be blamed for being irresponsi ble on the grounds that (a) she has brought a fair amount of gratuitous suffering into the world and (b) she had a readily available alternative.
But what if the woman has no alternative but to risk having an af flicted child, as is currently the case with HIV-infected women? The answer depends primarily on the magnitude and certainty of the evil. If a woman could only have one child who would have to be born with a withered arm, I do not think that it would be terribly irresponsible of her knowingly to conceive such a child. Although it would have been wrong if the woman had an easily available alternative, the absence of other options and the relatively mild nature of the deformity would make her choice permissible, even were the outcome certain.
When we substitute AIDS for the withered arm in this story, the choice seems manifestly irresponsible. It would be wrong knowingly to have a child who would surely suffer from a terrible chronic illness and die at the age of four, seven, or ten, even were that child's life, on the whole, worth living. The fact that unconceived or unborn children could end up having lives that were on balance worthwhile cannot function as an all-purpose excuse for imposing grievous pain, suffering, and deprivation on them. Although such children may not, strictly speaking, be "victims" because they presumably have no alternatives to either nonexistence or this particular "minimally decent" life (Parfit 1984) , it is still irresponsible and wrong of parents to expose them to a high risk of great suffering.
Because we presently lack this kind of foreknowledge, the crucial question is whether subjecting a child to a 20 to 30 percent chance of HIV infection lies beyond the pale of reproductive responsibility. Given the difficulty of this issue, it is not surprising that our society is sending decidedly mixed messages. On the one hand, the CDC and state departments of health have nearly unanimously recommended that HIV-infected women be advised to avoid future pregnancies. Ac cording to one researcher who has polled all state health departments on this question, only New Jersey does not recommend directive coun seling to nonpregnant, infected women (Ronald Bayer 1990, personal communication). It could be argued, however, that public-health officials are not an ideal population sample for determining the larger society's views on reproductive responsibility. Their perspective has traditionally focused rather narrowly on preventing the transmission of disease rather than on the comparatively more delicate question of the moral uses of personal privacy rights.
At the other extreme, one could poll genetic counselors to learn that nondirective counseling is the norm across the board, even for diseases like Tay-Sachs. The problem with identifying this group as typical of our society is that it exhibits an opposite bias in favor of personal re productive autonomy at the expense of all other values, such as harm to others and the just allocation of resources (Wertz and Fletcher 1989) .
The very intensity and polarization of the public debate on this mat ter leads me to conclude that the risk assumed by HIV-infected women is neither clearly responsible nor clearly irresponsible, but rather lies on the margin of societal acceptability. Although the majority in our soci ety no doubt deems such a harm/probability ratio to be extremely problematic, and although most people would shun this level of risk for their offspring, I do not detect a widespread conviction that others would always be wrong to assume such a risk, especially if they have no other options.
Most of this lack of clarity and certainty would be dispelled by a reli able prenatal assay such as the test for maternal antibodies to glycopro tein gp 120. Ability to predict with, say, 85 to 90 percent confidence that any particular HIV-infected woman would give birth to an in fected child would almost surely cross the threshold of "unacceptable risk." However, medical advance is a two-edged sword. By the time a highly predictive diagnostic test is available, effective antiviral and pro phylactic agents may also be developed, thus considerably lowering the magnitude of the threatened harm.
Burdens to Women
Although my analysis to this point has appropriately focused on childcentered concerns, a full moral accounting requires consideration of the likely burdens that reproductive restraint would impose on HIVinfected women. Because these burdens have already been eloquently catalogued by Carol Levine and Nancy N. Dubler, 1 shall limit myself to two brief points.
First, as several commentators have pointed out, childbearing has come to assume an overriding importance for women from the affected communities (Gross 1987; Holman et al. 1989) . Largely due to the ab sence of alternative sources of self-realization, satisfaction, and comfon, poor women o f color are under intense psychological and social pres sures to have children. Asking them to refrain permanendy from child bearing may thus amount to asking them to forgo their only remaining source of personal identity and social status.
Secondly, this burden o f abnegating motherhood will be made weightier still when abonion is the only remaining means of preventing birth. For women with moral or religious objections, abortion will obvi ously be an unacceptable means of preventing HIV infection. To insist that these women have a moral duty to abort all fetuses at risk would amount to a violation of their own rights of conscience.
Even for women who approve of abortion in general -indeed, even those who view abortion in these circumstances as their particular moral duty-abonion remains an option exercised in necessity and sorrow. Contrary to some philosophers' glib comparisons between the moral seriousness of abortion and getting one's hair cut, for most women hav ing an abortion is an occasion of loss and sadness, even when thought to be fully justified. This burden must also be weighed on the scales of moral judgment concerning reproductive responsibility.
Moral Conclusions
Perhaps the most important result of the analysis here is the conclusion that the risk to which children of HIV-infected mothers are exposed, while exceedingly problematic, is not clearly immoral according to our societal standards. If I am right about this, it follows that the presence of HIV infection alone should not be considered a sufficient reason for a judgment of parental irresponsibility. This is not to say that all HIVinfected women act responsibly and morally in deciding to have chil dren-far from it; rather, it is to say that no blanket conclusions can be drawn about the choices of infected women as a class. If this conclusion is correct, then the CDC and state health departments should stop recommending reproductive restraint for a ll infected women.
Although the risks of perinatal HIV infection lie on the margins of societal acceptabihty, they remain deeply problematic and compel care ful moral scrutiny of each and every reproductive choice. Instead of be ing guided by any blanket rule, such scrutiny should consist in a highly contexmalized and sensitive balancing of all of the morally relevant fac tors discussed above. This approach will yield different conclusions de pending upon the particular circumstances of each case.
Let us consider two hypothetical examples drawn from opposite ends of the moral spectrum. First, take the case of Janet, a young woman in fected by a previous sex partner. Currently childless, she is now married to an uninfected man who is fully committed to raising a child with her or, if necessary, with the help of a large and devoted extended family. She is currently in good health, having only recently been in fected, and could have several good years before the onset of serious HIV disease. Janet finds herself pregnant, deeply desirous of having and loving a child, and very ambivalent about the morality of abor tion. Although both she and her husband ought to approach their choice "in fear and trembling" for the well-being of their child, their decision to go forward with the pregnancy appears justifiable. Now consider the case o f Joan, a homeless crack addict whose three previous children have all been placed in foster care. Having no desire for additional children, she became pregnant trading sex for crack, and has stayed pregnant by default. Although she considers abortion merely to be another form of birth control, and although (in this fictional case) there have been no legal, clinical, or financial barriers to access, Joan has failed to obtain an abortion by default. Dmg-seeking behavior has ef fectively eclipsed all her other concerns. She has been abandoned by her former husband, disowned by her family, and now lives on the streets. She has been infected for a long time, and her health is very poor.
This hypothetical case, a veritable catalogue of all the social ills dis tilled in the crucible of the AIDS epidemic, elicits conflicting responses. On the one hand, Joan strikes us as a living, breathing indictment of the system that consigned her to the garbage heap of society. We want to ease this woman's pain, find her decent housing, and provide her with the kind of drug rehabilitation and medical care that she so des perately needs and deserves.
On the other hand, Joan's "choice" -really a nonchoice-to have this child despite her current lack of desire or ability to provide the child with love, care, and a suitable home, should strike us as a para digmatic case of parental irresponsibility. Simply put, Joan has no busi ness having additional children, particularly children who would be at risk for HIV infection. We can conclude this even while condemning the society that has turned its back on her and absolving her of any moral blame for her addicted state. The fact remains that she is about to expose another human being to a high risk of a life-threatening ill ness and social neglect for no good reason. Joan may have the legal right to act as she does, but her behavior in this case is seriously ir responsible and wrong.
These two hypotheticals are of course atypical; the vast majority of cases will fall somewhere between these moral extremes, where there is bound to be a rather large gray area of intractable moral uncertainty. The point in rehearsing them has been to illustrate how particular moral judgments on reproductive responsibility will largely be a func tion, not exclusively of the harm/probability ratio, but of factors quite adventitiously linked to women's HIV infection as well. It just so hap pens that, o f all the women infected by this vims, many desperately want children because of their socioeconomic circumstances, and that many others are desperately addicted to drugs and unable to care for their children. The specific constellation of these morally relevant fac tors should supplement our indecisive anguish over reproductive risk and guide our moral assessments of particular cases. In many cases, however, even this supplementary moral evidence will not be enough to yield confident conclusions.
Finally, we should recall that the development of a reliable prenatal diagnostic test in the absence of effective treatments for HIV would most likely render otiose this labored, particularistic approach to assess ing reproductive choices. Probabilities on the order of 75 to 100 per cent of eventual perinatal infection would allow us to view the harm/ probability ratio alone as a sufficient indicator of moral irresponsibility.
Implications for Intervention
If the arguments I have presented carry weight, we must try to deter mine with more precision which kinds of societal intervention into the reproductive decisions of HIV-infected women might be warranted. In this final section, I shall briefly examine the dominant method of non directive counseling and then consider three alternatives: frankly coer cive interventions; a beefed-up " educational model" o f nondirective counseling; and noncoercive, "negotiated" directive counseling.
Nondirective Counseling
The counseling of HIV-infected women has by and large followed the nondirective approach developed by genetic counselors rather than the mote directive approach usually favored by medical professionals (Wertz and Fletcher 1989 ). The nondirective model upholds an ideal of "value neutrality" and puts a premium on establishing a trusting, sup portive relationship with the client. The counselor's role consists in pro viding factual information (e.g., the risks of transmission), helping the client understand the meaning of the various alternatives for her own life, and supporting her decision, whatever that happens to be. Al though nondirectiveness does not preclude probing the client's initial decision-for example, to discover possible contradictions between her stated preferences and her more deeply held values -the counselor would not be permitted critically to invoke values other than those the client holds. Recommending any particular course of action is viewed as an unethical usurpation of the client's decision-making authority.
So long as HIV-infected women's reproductive risks remain roughly within the ambit of broadly held views, some version of nondirective counseling would appear to be appropriate. If there is no clear evidence that the decisions of a certain group fall outside of a moral consensus, society lacks the requisite moral authority to articulate a preferred use o f reproductive freedom.
Having endorsed nondirective counseling given the current state of medical knowledge, I want to lodge two caveats against this model. One is general and the other specific to its use in HIV-related cases. First, the decision-making authority of clients is not necessarily depen dent upon nondirective counseling. Although the first generation of genetic counselors may have had good pragmatic reasons to abandon the more directive approaches associated with discredited eugenic goals (President's Gjmmission 1983), it is simply not m ie-at least in the abstract-that clients' reproductive rights are necessarily violated by any and all forms of directive counseling. So long as such counseling seeb to alter behavior by means of rational persuasion rather than coercion, it is compatible with the fully voluntary exercise of reproductive rights. Thus, we should not mistake, as do many partisans of nondirective counseling, a pragmatic justification for nondirectiveness in most ge netic contexts with some sort of universal, axiomatic, and self-evident moral principle.
Second, nondirective counseling for HTV-infected women appears to be substantially ineffective in altering reproductive decision making. Unlike the largely efficacious role of non-directive counseling for those concerned with Tay-Sachs disease, recent studies suggest that knowl edge of one's HIV-positive status, coupled with nondirective counsel ing, is most likely not a determining factor in decisions to terminate pregnancies. No statistically significant differences in reproductive be havior were found between groups of infected and uninfected dmg users in Brooklyn and the Bronx. Over 20 percent in each group be came pregnant over a two-year period, and roughly the same percen tage (40 percent o f seropositives vs. 50 percent of scronegatives) opted for abortion. O f those seropositives who became pregnant, over 25 per cent became pregnant a second time (Sunderland et al. 1988; Selwyn et al. 1989 ).
Although nondirective counseling might be maximally responsive to the autonomy of clients, it appears to do little, if anything, to advance the value of protecting future children from harm. Because supportive nondirectiveness is not theoretically the only approach to counseling compatible with reproductive rights, we appear to have some motiva tion and ethical warrant to explore other approaches. We need, how ever, to deal with the charge that any moral arguments on behalf of fumre children logically entail straightforwardly coercive interventions.
Coercive Interventions
There are two ways to coerce the reproductive behavior of HIV-infected women. First, one can intervene physically, forcing a woman to submit to involuntary sterilization or abortion. From the woman's point of view, such "acts" ate entirely divorced from her will. Although a policy of physically coerced "reproductive responsibility" would be maximally responsive to the interests of future children, it would achieve this end through utterly unacceptable violations of the person and rights of women. Although forced sterilization or abortion would be uncon scionable even if we had a foolproof prenatal diagnostic screening test for HIV infection, the fact that 70 to 80 percent of the children are born uninfected merely underscores the immorality of this option.
The second modality of coercive intervention would confront the woman with two unwanted alternatives-for example, submitting to an abortion or risking a cutoff of health-care benefits. This kind of coer cion works through threats, which constrain, but do not completely an nul, the woman's will. She is still able to ponder the alternatives and make a rational choice between them. Such proposals are considered "coercive" because by posing two unacceptable alternatives they threaten to make the woman worse off in terms of her own value preferences than she was prior to the intervention (Feinberg 1986; Werthheimer 1987) .
This kind of coercion is morally wrong because, although it does not involve physical violence, it would violate the woman's right to either reproductive liberty or access to medical care. Even though some might think that a woman's particular reproductive choices are unwise or im moral, our social policy is based on a premise of self-determination. Competent women do not and should not have to pass an ethics or "rationality" test in order to exercise their freedom to have or not have children. They should certainly never be forced to barter their repro ductive rights for health care.
A "M oral Education " M o d el o f N ondirective Counseling
This alternative approach to the counselor-client dialogue would be based upon a distinction, articulated by Jay Katz (1984, 110-29) , be tween autonomy as a right of final decision making, which it respects, and unfettered autonomy in the process of deciding, which it rejects. The goal of the educational model is to clarify the client's values and expand her awareness o f the moral dimensions of her choices through respectful exchanges, not merely to offer a recitation of the medical facts on HIV transmission.
Counselors would ask whether the client has thought about the suffering she risks imposing on her future child and the likelihood of the child becoming an orphan. Is she denying or underestimating the magnitude or likelihood of infection? Has she considered the impact that an HIV-infected child might have on existing siblings? Are her motives for pregnancy sufficiently weighty, given the deadly serious stakes, or is she failing to consider the potential child's separate dignity and interests? Although counselors would not tell the woman what they think she ought to do, they would attempt to confront her with the full force of the moral dilenunas she actually faces.
Authentic decision-making capacity presupposes an appreciation of the nature and meaning of potential alternatives-what it would be and feel like to be in possible future states and to undergo various ex periences (Buchanan and Brock 1986, 25) . The educational model would sanction efforts to foster such affective appreciation. For exam ple, counselors could discuss the experiences of other clients who have had HIV-infected children or what it was like for the children and par ents as AIDS eventually took its toll.
This model would similarly permit counselors to invite infected women, obtaining their informed consent beforehand, to tour the pe diatric AIDS unit at a local hospital to see for themselves what happens to some of the unlucky infants. Advocates for disabled persons approve of this technique, encouraging genetic counselors to facilitate visits of prospective parents to the homes o f disabled children (Asch 1989) .
AIDS counselors might recommend a visit to the pediatric AIDS unit as a step toward achieving genuinely inform ed decision making. In or der to achieve balance, clients could also visit the homes of children who were not HIV infected, although the utility of such an option is not apparent.
Although it deviates significantly from a purely "client centered" ap proach to nondirective counseling, this model calls attention to the plight of HIV-infected children while refraining from articulating a so cially preferred conception of reproductive responsibility. So long as the content of the educational message remains well balanced-and so long as counselors refrain from threatening, badgering, or other forms of verbal intimidation-the approach would offer the prospect of an at tractive, noncoercive compromise between respectful but apparently in effective nondirective counseling and the mote highly controversial directive model. Indeed, the kind of personal involvement, observa tion, and reflection promised by this model could well prove even more effective in altering infected women's behavior than frankly direc tive counseling based only upon the recitation of abstract statistics.
Negotiated Directive Counseling
A more controversial, but possibly justifiable, counseling model would abandon the widespread professional ideology of supportive nondirec tiveness in those cases where decisions deviate significantly from a social consensus on reproductive responsibility. Clients like Joan, the home less crack addict and demonstrably unfit mother discussed above, would presently qualify as a candidate for directive counseling. Likewise, the fumte development of a reliable prenatal diagnostic test might justify directive counseling for women whose fetuses proved to be at risk.
In addition to engaging in the kinds of discussion appropriate to nondirective and "educational" counselors, directive counselors would make a forthright recommendation to avoid pregnancy or to have an abortion. They would emphatically acknowledge women's moral and legal rights to make reproductive decisions according to their own stan dards of risk assessment, and sympathize with their desire for more children. However, they would disagree with particular women's un willingness to assume parental responsibilities for their child or with their willingness to expose their future children to, say, an 85 percent chance o f infection with the AIDS virus.
This kind o f directive counseling, like any other kind of clinically responsible service, would have to be carefully contextualized, espe cially with regard to abortion counseling. Some women believe that abortion, even for the "fetus's own sake," is immoral. Before making a recommendation to abort, counselors would have to be knowledgeable about women's views on this matter.
The voluntary, noncoercive nature of this model would have to be underscored. Counselors would have to preface and conclude their ad vice with a firm and genuine reminder that the choice is ultimately the woman's to make, that their recom m endation is precisely that and nothing more. This approach thus differs greatly from coercive variants o f directive counseling that attempt to skew the woman's reasoning process and judgment by means of threats, enticements, and verbal intimidation.
As a moral precondition of this approach, counselors would have to negotiate through open dialogue with the client about the mumal ac ceptability of a directive approach that significantly deviates from cur rent professional norms. Any overtly directive counseling, that is, would be preceded by obtaining the client's free and informed consent. Thus, in addition to offering information and seeking to clarify values, counselors would make a recommendation if a woman wishes to hear it. (1 derive this notion of " negotiated" directive counseling from a communication with John Fletcher.)
This last requirement might strike some people as odd or uimecessary. If such counseling is supposed to be genuinely noncoercive, con sisting of advice rather than oven or veiled threats, why should one have to secure the client's prior informed consent?
In the abstract, there is a point to this objection. If directive counsel ing, so defined, is entirely noncoercive, counselors have no apparent ethical duty to obtain consent merely to offer nonbinding advice. The requirement is based, however, on the concrete social reality that "ofificially sanctioned" directive counseling is not currendy channeled to any other social groups, including the carriers of Tay-Sachs disease. Put an other way, obtaining prior consent to directive counseling is based on concern for the "moral equal protection" of the members of this most vulnerable social group.
Conclusions a n d Som e Reservations about Directiveness
I conclude that of the four counseling models surveyed, the moral edu cation model is the most appropriate at this time for the majority of HIV-infected women. While it is nondirective about the eventual con tent of the woman's choice, this model insists that the process of reach ing a decision include a forthright discussion of the ethical dilemmas posed by reproduction under the specter of AIDS. Although acknowledg ing women's right to choose according to their own lights, and refraining from articulating a preferred societal conclusion, the moral education model would reject the notion that women have a moral right to waive a serious ethical consideration of possible grave harm to others. Practi tioners of this model could also, o f course, be emotionally supportive of the woman's eventual decision, whatever that might be, but only a f ter she has pondered, to the best of her abilities, the moral dilemma in all its force and complexity.
Should a reliable (e.g., 80 to 100 percent) prenatal test for eventual pediatric seropositivity be developed in the absence of vastly improved therapeutics for AIDS, some form of blanket directive counseling, pref erably negotiated, might be justified. Although I find this model of directive counseling to be fully consonant with women's moral agency, two caveats are in order.
One very serious problem concerns the likely long-term consequences of implementing an ideal model of directive counseling in the real world. Whereas ideal directive counselors would neither coerce nor intimidate their clients in any way, scrupulously honoring their reproductive rights, in the real world of understaffed, overcrowded, depersonalized innercity health clinics, things might not work out as planned. Harried and frustrated at best, insensitive and racist at worst, counselors in what has been aptly called the "medical third world" of inner-city AIDS might well be tempted to coerce their vulnerable clients in accord with their own societal agendas. To borrow a phrase from a leading critical theo rist, real-world encounters between AIDS counselors and HIV-infected women might well be tainted by "systematically distorted communica tion" (Habermas 1980) . The participants in this dialogue ate already separated by tremendous disparities of power, race, and class. In view of the dependency of these women on the medical establishment for whatever small amount of care, often in the form of methadone, that they receive, it may be dangerously naive to assume that the wide spread practice of directive counseling will not have subtly coercive long-term effects.
Although abuse is possible with any approach to counseling, it is not obvious to me that such widespread coercion would in fact occur. In the first place, the requirement of prior informed consent would give the client an effective veto power over the use of directive counseling. My own discussions with AIDS counselors and caregivers from the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan provide additional reassurance. In meeting after meeting on this issue, the counselors I have encountered have been vociferously and almost universally hostile to normegotiated directive counseling because of its perceived threat to women's repro ductive rights. In any case, a program of directive counseling would have to be very carefully implemented and periodically monitored, ideally with the help of the client population.
A second problem concerns the prospects of any kind of counseling to change behavior in socially desirable ways. The record of nondirec tive counseling has so far been consistently disappointing. Even the mild form o f directive counseling advocated by the CDC-that in fected women postpone pregnancies until more is known about HIV (Centers for Disease Control 1985)-appears to have had litde, if any, effect. Whether the "moral educational" or "negotiated directive" mod els would be more effective is difficult to predict. Practitioners of direc tive counseling will have an especially difficult task attempting to encourage reproductive restraint without becoming reproachful and alienating their clients. Respectful dialogue will remain the cornerstone o f successful counseling.
Perhaps the most formidable barrier to behavior change, however, lodges in the ethnic and political dimensions of this debate. So long as the issue is seen as a case of white, middle-class professionals telling poor women o f color not to have babies, heated charges of racism and genocide are likely to claim center stage, forcing a legitimate concern for the suffering of children to the wings. So long as HIV-infected clients regard their counselors as foreign "others," as emissaries of an alien sociomedical establishment, they will remain resistant, if not ac tively hostile, to the suggestion that they forgo further childbearing.
As the history of genetic counseling for Tay-Sachs carriers attests (President's Commission 1983) , the support of the local community is required to change reproductive behavior. Effective preventive inter ventions will require the voluntary and communal alteration of deeply held values and cultural traditions. If counselors' messages are not en dorsed by supportive echoes in families, churches, schools, clinics, and community newspapers, they will most likely fall on deaf ears. One important way to address the problem of ethnic conflict might be to introduce both the educational and negotiated directive models in the less threatening environment of peer counseling rather than tra ditional "expert-client" encounters. Persons from the affected commu nities who appreciate the seriousness of the risks, empathize with their fellow citizens, and speak with credibility among their peers should be selected for this kind of counseling.
It may well turn out, however, that in spite of the best efforts of such counselors, the model of directive counseling would prove unacceptable both clinically and politically within the affected communities. In the event of such intractable disagreement about the boundaries of accept able risk between representatives of the societal mainstream and partic ular subcultures, other ways of decreasing the spread of perinatal HIV infection will have to be explored. The burden of this article has in part been merely to show that negotiated directive counseling can be morally justified under certain conditions. Whether its widespread deployment will be clinically effective or politically wise are separate questions deserving of serious further inquiry.
